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Does the Federal Tax Treatment
Of Housing Affect the Pattern
Of Metropolitan Development?
Richard Voith*
To encourage home ownership, the United
States tax code treats the financing and sale of
housing differently from most other goods.  For
example, the interest payments on your home
mortgage and your property taxes are deduct-
ible from your federal income taxes while the
interest on your credit card bill for your vacation
to Paris is not.  Furthermore, the profit you make
on the sale of your house may be exempt from
capital gains taxation, but similar profits on your
mutual funds are not. These special provisions
in the tax code–the deductibility of mortgage in-
terest and property taxes from federal income
taxes and the special treatment of capital gains
on the sale of owner-occupied housing–effec-
tively lower the cost of owner-occupied housing
relative to other goods. Lowering the after-tax
cost of owner-occupied housing favors home
ownership because it gives owning a financial
advantage over renting for higher income house-
*Dick Voith is an economic advisor in the Research
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holds that can take advantage of these provi-
sions.1
While providing an incentive for home own-
ership, the special status of owner-occupied
housing in the federal tax code has other conse-
quences as well.  One is its effect on the level of
investment in housing: by lowering after-tax
housing costs, the tax code encourages increased
investment in housing because households buy
larger houses and bigger lots than they other-
wise would.2  An area that has been the focus of
far less attention is the potential impact of tax
incentives on the patterns of metropolitan de-
velopment.
Relative to metropolitan areas in other devel-
oped countries except Australia, U.S. metropoli-
tan areas have very low densities. The densest
metropolitan area in the United States, New York,
with 5561 people per square mile, is far less
dense than typical metropolitan areas in Europe.
For example, Paris has 12,489 people per square
mile, Amsterdam 13,152, and Stockholm 13,294.3
Asian metropolitan areas are even denser, with
Hong Kong topping out at 75,992 people per
square mile. Not only are U.S. metropolitan ar-
eas less dense than their counterparts outside
the United States, American central cities, with
the exception of New York City, tend to be less
dense as well.
Of course, European and Asian countries typi-
cally have less land overall for their populations,
and therefore, one might expect that their cities
and metropolitan areas would have greater
population density.  Furthermore, European cit-
ies were developed largely before the automo-
bile, which partially explains their higher den-
sity. The impact of the automobile can be seen in
American cities as well: older American cities
tend to be denser than those developed after cars
became the dominant means of transportation.
Land availability and city age do not tell the
whole story, however. Toronto, for example, is
nearly twice as dense as the New York metro-
politan area, despite the fact that land is abun-
dant in Canada and that Toronto’s development
has been relatively recent. In Europe, Sweden is
less dense overall than the United States, yet its
largest metropolitan area, Stockholm, is far
denser than any U.S. metropolitan area.
Metropolitan areas throughout the world
have been decentralizing, but the pace of decen-
tralization has been especially rapid in the
United States.  Most U.S. central cities have ex-
perienced not only population declines relative
to their suburbs but absolute population de-
clines as well. Some declines in central city popu-
lation have been dramatic; for example, St. Louis
lost nearly half of its population from 1960
through 1990. Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit,
and Buffalo all lost more than 38 percent of their
populations over the same period. Among the
20 largest U.S. central cities that did not expand
their geographic borders, only Los Angeles and
Miami significantly gained population.4 In con-
trast to most U.S. central cities, the central cities
of most large Canadian metropolitan areas have
1Technically, the deductibility of mortgage interest
and property taxes from federal income taxes provides a
tax advantage only because the imputed value of rental
income of owner-occupied housing is not taxed. Land-
lords can deduct mortgage interest and property taxes
from federal income tax, but they must pay taxes on the
rental income they receive from tenants. Home owners,
on the other hand, do not pay taxes on the implicit rental
income of the house.  The tax advantages of owner-
occupancy are offset, to some extent, by the ability of
landlords to depreciate their property.
2See the article by Edwin S. Mills and the articles
referenced therein for estimates of the effects of tax-re-
lated housing subsidies on the level of housing invest-
ment.
3The international comparisons have been computed
by Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy and are pub-
lished in Cities and Automobile Dependence: An Interna-
tional Sourcebook, Brookfield: Gower Technical (1989). The
data are for 1980; unfortunately, more recent interna-
tionally comparable data are not available.
4See the 1997 Working Paper by Joseph Gyourko and
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continued to grow, although at a slower pace
than their suburbs.
Not only have most U.S. cities lost popula-
tion, but the 20 largest central cities that did not
expand their boundaries became poorer relative
to their suburbs (Table 1).  In 1960, city per capita
incomes averaged 93.2 percent of suburban in-
comes, and eight of the 20 cities had higher aver-
age per capita incomes than their suburban
neighbors. By 1990, city per capita incomes av-
eraged only 75.3 percent of suburban per capita
incomes, and only two cities had average in-
comes greater than or equal to those of their sub-
urban neighbors. Even though real income grew
in all cities during the period, real income in the
city grew at a much slower pace than in the sub-
urbs, so per capita income in all 20 cities fell
relative to that in their suburbs.
Most observers of U.S. metropolitan develop-
ment, with its low density and increasing con-
centration of low-income households in the cen-
ter, assume that this pattern is simply a result of
American preferences for open space, of the
abundant supply of land, and of changes in
transportation and communications technology.
This pattern, however, may reflect not only
people’s tastes and technological change but also
the relative costs of housing and land, which, in
part, reflect the tax advantages of owner-occu-
pied housing. While mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes have long been deductible from fed-
eral income taxes, the value of these deductions
for high-income households increased signifi-
cantly in most of the second half of the century
as marginal tax rates for these households in-
creased.5 The impact of these subsidies on pat-
TABLE 1
Ratios of City Per Capita
Income to Suburban Per
Capita Income
1960, 1990, and Change from 1960-1990
% Change
1960 1990 1960-90
Detroit 0.92 0.54 -41.3
Baltimore 0.91 0.64 -29.7
Milwaukee 0.85 0.63 -26.9
Oakland 1.02 0.75 -26.5
Miami 0.87 0.67 -23.0
Cleveland 0.69 0.53 -23.2
Buffalo 0.89 0.69 -22.5
Atlanta 1.14 0.89 -21.9
Philadelphia 0.83 0.65 -20.7
Minneapolis 1.08 0.86 -20.4
Chicago 0.82 0.66 -19.5
Cincinnati 1.01 0.82 -18.8
St. Louis 0.76 0.64 -15.8
Washington 1.00 0.86 -14.0
Pittsburgh 1.02 0.88 -13.7
San Francisco 0.95 0.82 -13.7
Seattle 1.18 1.03 -12.7
New York 0.75 0.68 -9.3
Boston 0.87 0.81 -7.9
Los Angeles 1.07 1.00 -6.5
Source: Income data are from the County and City
Data Book Consolidated File 1947-77 (tape),
County and City Data Book 1983 (tape), and
County and City Data Book 1994 (CD ROM).  All
dollar values are deflated using the national CPI,
with 1982-84=100.
5The marginal tax rate for households with incomes
that are twice the median income trended upward from
about 22 percent in 1955 to over 40 percent in 1981.
Marginal rates for these households declined consider-
ably after the tax law changes in 1981, 1982, 1984, and
1986 but, at 28 percent, remain higher than in the 1950s.
Note there has been very little change in the marginal rate
for median income households. See the paper by Leonard
Burman, William Gale, and David Weiner.6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 1999
terns of metropolitan development is long term
in nature, so that the full consequences of
changes in the value of deductibility may not be
fully realized for decades. The extent to which
the long-run consequences of public policy,
rather than people’s tastes, have led to the dis-
persed pattern of development and the relative
decline of U.S. central cities is an important
policy question.
SUBURBANIZATION: PREFERENCES
AND TECHNOLOGY OR POLICY?
Preferences and changes in technology are
undoubtedly important factors driving the de-
centralization in U.S. metropolitan areas. Tradi-
tional models of metropolitan development sug-
gest that improvements in transportation and
communication technologies, as well as growth
in income, result in increased decentralization.
Improvements in transportation and communi-
cations reduce commuting costs and increase
the desirability of residential parcels farther from
employment centers. At the same time, advances
in production technologies lessen the need for
centralized production facilities and thereby
make central locations for residences less im-
perative. The pace of technological change aug-
ments decentralization in another way: better
technology increases our productivity and makes
us wealthier. Higher income, in turn, increases
the demand for larger houses on larger lots, thus
leading to less dense patterns of development.
These traditional urban models are consis-
tent with geographic sorting by income, with
wealthier residents living in suburban locations,
but the framework does not necessarily imply
that wealthier households choose only subur-
ban residences.  From a theoretical point of view,
the choice between a city or a suburban location
for higher income households depends on two
factors that work in opposite directions. On the
one hand, higher income increases the demand
for land, and this demand encourages more dis-
persed, suburban locations where land is in
abundant supply.  On the other hand, higher
income imports greater value to people’s time,
and a more distant location may involve more
time spent commuting. Given a household’s
budget and prices for housing and transporta-
tion, people’s preferences—how much they value
housing, land, and time—determine where they
choose to live and how much land they consume.
Although most high-income communities in U.S.
metropolitan areas are suburban, there are many
exceptions.  For example, the upper East Side of
Manhattan and the Golden Mile in Chicago are
dense, central city areas that have many high-
income residents.
Many economists have argued that the ob-
served U.S. pattern of development reflects
unique American preferences for low density liv-
ing that have resulted in wealthier households’
outbidding lower income households for low
density suburban housing. Economists Edwin
Mills and Peter Mieszkowski call attention to
the role of preferences:
“The older, smaller, centrally located units,
built when average real incomes were lower,
filter down to lower income groups.  This
natural working of the housing market leads
to income stratified neighborhoods, and there
is a tendency for low income groups to live in
central locations, and for affluent households
to reside in outlying suburban areas.  The
majority of the middle class apparently prefers
larger single family lots in the suburbs to denser
multi-family residences in the central city.”  (em-
phasis added)6
People’s preferences, however, do not exist in a
vacuum.  Even if people have strong preferences
for houses on large lots, the lot size they choose
will be affected by the price they have to pay.
6Note that in the absence of an assumption of prefer-
ences for low density living, sorting by income in the
traditional monocentric model could just as well result
in higher income households’ choosing city residences.Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development? Richard Voith
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The costs of housing and transportation, which
have been affected significantly by public poli-
cies, may play an important role in establishing
the U.S. pattern of metropolitan development.
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TAX
TREATMENT OF HOUSING
Tax breaks for owner-occupied housing
amount to about $65 billion annually.7 These tax
breaks increase demand for housing. The extent
to which the increased demand simply increases
the price of houses rather than the amount of
housing investment depends on how develop-
ers respond. If developers do not increase the
supply of housing, the market price of houses
simply rises until there is no change in after-tax
housing costs and therefore no change in the
rate of housing investment. Economists say that
the tax break is “capitalized” into the price of
the house.  On the other hand, if housing supply
readily adjusts, the market price of houses rises
very little and the after-tax cost of housing falls,
encouraging individuals to buy larger houses
on bigger lots.
There is a wide range of estimates on how
extensively federal tax breaks are capitalized into
the price of housing. In a recent paper, Todd Sinai
estimated that about 20 percent of the value of
federal tax breaks for housing are capitalized
into the price of houses, although earlier papers
found much higher capitalization rates.8 Also,
capitalization rates are likely to differ widely
across communities. In suburban communities
on the urban fringe where land is in abundant
supply, developers can easily increase the rate
of construction in response to an increase in de-
mand. In those communities, we would expect
an increase in housing subsidies to result in in-
creased construction rather than increased
prices.  However, in dense, fully developed com-
munities, housing subsidies are more likely to
be capitalized into house prices because there is
less land available for new housing.9
To the extent that part of the value of tax de-
ductions is capitalized into the value of a house,
tax breaks help maintain the high values of resi-
dential properties in communities with high-in-
come residents. Even if tax breaks are not capi-
talized, eliminating deductibility or reducing its
value would lower the demand for housing, es-
pecially for large houses, which would result in
a short-run oversupply of these homes. The ex-
7There is a range of estimates for the aggregate value
of housing tax breaks.  For 1999, the Treasury Depart-
ment estimates the mortgage interest and property tax
deduction will reduce tax receipts by $72.1 billion (Auten
and Reschovsky). Todd Sinai estimates that current tax
breaks for mortgage interest and property tax deduc-
tions reduce tax payments by about $56.2 billion per
year.  Using simple assumptions regarding house values
and marginal income tax rates, I estimate the value of
deductions to be about $65 billion, an amount that falls
between the above two estimates.
For comparison, federal highway expenditures, which
are often cited as a factor in promoting decentralization,
totaled $19.4 billion in 1994, less than one-third the value
of tax breaks for owner-occupied housing.  Source: Table
83, National Transportation Statistics, 1996, U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Sta-
tistics.  Note that the federal highway expenditures are
not subsidies for highways, since the bulk of the expen-
ditures is financed by user fees.  However, the new high-
way investments make decentralization feasible, and fre-
quently, new highway investments are located in fast-
growing suburban markets on the urban fringe.  In my
paper “Transportation Investments in the Philadelphia
Metropolitan Area: Who Benefits? Who Pays? And What
Are the Consequences?” I show that in the Philadelphia
area, per capita highway expenditures benefiting subur-
ban residents are about 2.5 times the size of those ben-
efiting city residents. Because suburban residents also
drive more, they also pay proportionately higher user
fees.
8See, for example, the paper by Jesse Abraham and
Patric Hendershott.
9Because older developed communities compete with
communities on the urban fringe, the extent to which
federal taxes can be capitalized into prices is limited.
Local taxes and subsidies, however, are more likely to be
fully capitalized because of the competition among com-
munities for residents.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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cess supply of large houses would result in de-
clining values for these properties until natural
growth in demand restored the balance between
supply and demand.
Because the value of deductibility varies
across individuals of different incomes, and be-
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more likely to pur-
chase larger houses with bigger mortgages and
higher property taxes. Therefore, deductibility
is more valuable for higher income households
(Table 2).10  As house values and incomes rise,
the value of deductibility increases rapidly. A
wealthy household that owns a $500,000 house
TABLE 2
Ownership-Related Deductions
In Excess of the Standard Deduction*
Interest and Value of
Property Taxes - Assumed Deductions
House Interest + Standard Marginal for Assumed
Prices Property Taxes Deduction Rate Tax Rate
$20,000 $1,660 ($4,890) .15 $0
$25,000 $2,075 ($4,475) .15 $0
$35,000 $2,905 ($3,645) .15 $0
$45,000 $3,735 ($2,815) .15 $0
$55,000 $4,565 ($1,985) .15 $0
$65,000 $5,395 ($1,155) .15 $0
$75,000 $6,225 ($325) .15 $0
$85,000 $7,055 $505 .28 $141
$95,000 $7,885 $1,335 .28 $374
$112,500 $9,338 $2,788 .28 $781
$137,500 $11,413 $4,863 .28 $1,362
$162,500 $13,488 $6,938 .28 $1,943
$187,500 $15,563 $9,013 .28 $2,524
$225,000 $18,675 $12,125 .31 $3,759
$275,000 $22,825 $16,275 .31 $5,045
$350,000 $29,050 $22,500 .36 $8,100
$450,000 $37,350 $30,800 .36 $11,088
$500,000 $41,500 $34,950 .36 $12,582
*There are five key assumptions underlying the calculations in Table 2: 1) a loan
to value ratio of 80 percent; 2) mortgage interest rate of 8.5 percent; 3) an effective
property tax rate of 1.5 percent; 4) the standard deduction, which is forgone for
those choosing to itemize their tax deductions, is equal to $6550; and 5) household
income is consistent with house values using the rule of thumb that house values are
2.5 times annual household income.  Note that we ignore the possibility that house-
holds have other deductions such as large medical bills or local income taxes that
make itemization more attractive.  In addition, we do not analyze the complex
phase-out provisions for very high income households.Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development? Richard Voith
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could save more than $12,500 annually from de-
ducting mortgage interest and property taxes.
Thus, mortgage and property tax deductions rep-
resent large incentives for higher income people
to purchase more expensive houses that typi-
cally are on larger tracts.11 Because suburban
communities have a greater supply of land, they
have a competitive advantage in producing large
houses on large lots; therefore, tax deductions
increase the number of households choosing
suburban communities.
The housing deduction alone, however, can-
not explain geographic sorting by income.  As I
show in my 1998 paper with Joe Gyourko, the
differential value of housing-related tax deduc-
tions, when taken in isolation, simply results in
high-income households’ increasing their land
consumption more than low-income house-
holds, but not in high- and low-income house-
holds’ choosing different communities.  When
there are restrictions on land use such as mini-
mum-lot-size zoning, however, the differential
tax advantages for housing can provide a finan-
cial incentive for high- and low-income people
to locate in separate communities.  Because these
restrictions prevent low-income households
from buying small parcels, and because low-in-
come households do not benefit from tax-related
housing subsidies, they are likely to find the
parcels in communities with large minimum lot
sizes unaffordable. By the same token, the tax
advantages make the large parcels more attrac-
tive to higher income households that enjoy lower
after-tax costs. Thus, the tax code indirectly pro-
motes suburban communities for high-income
households and provides incentives for low-in-
come households to concentrate in older, denser
city neighborhoods. (See The Geographic Distri-
bution of Housing-Related Tax Savings.)
Deductibility: Effects on Community
Choices.  The twin factors of reduced after-tax
housing costs and subsidies that increase with
income affect not only the housing and location
choices of individuals but also communities’
choices.  In particular, they affect communities’
decisions regarding the provision of public
amenities and the use of  zoning restrictions,
such as minimum lot sizes, to exclude low-in-
come residents.
In high-income communities, property tax
deductibility lowers the cost of providing local
amenities, such as schools and parks, that are
financed by property taxes.  For example, a com-
munity in which all residents were in the 36 per-
cent tax bracket could raise $1 million in prop-
erty tax revenue for schools, but its residents
would pay only $640,000 because of deductibil-
ity.  For a community composed of moderate-
income residents who find it most advantageous
to use the standard deduction, the local residents
would pay the full $1 million for school fund-
ing.  By lowering the after-tax cost of local ameni-
ties for high-income communities, deductibility
is likely to increase the investment in public
amenities in these communities.  Thus, deduct-
ibility not only makes these communities more
financially attractive, it also helps them become
relatively more attractive in terms of the ameni-
ties they offer their residents.
A potentially more important consequence of
the special tax status of housing is its effect on
suburban communities’ choices regarding large-
lot zoning and other land-use rules that restrict
10The most striking aspect of Table 2 is that owners of
houses valued at $75,000 or less are not likely to receive
any benefit from deductibility. For these owners, it is in
their interest to use the standard deduction–which they
can take whether or not they own their housing–instead
of itemizing their deductions.  According to the IRS, 77
percent of all U.S. taxpayers use the standard deduction
and less than 40 percent of home owners use the mort-
gage interest and property tax deductions. Some home
owners choose not to hold mortgages and, therefore, do
not itemize, but they still receive the benefit of implicit
rental income that is not taxed.
11More expensive does not always mean more land.
Large apartments in Manhattan are very expensive, for
example, but consume very little land.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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The Geographic Distribution
Of Housing-Related Tax Savings
Geographic sorting by income, coupled with deductibility whose value increases with increases in
income and house value, has striking implications for the distribution of housing-related tax savings
across communities. Almost 57 percent of all owner-occupied homes in central cities were valued at
less than $80,000 (Table A), and thus their owners were unlikely to derive any benefit from the
deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes (see Table 2 on page 8). In the suburbs, where
average house values and household incomes are higher, the corresponding figure was only 37
percent. The high concentration of high-income households and large houses in suburban communi-
ties means that the tax savings associated with deductibility disproportionately benefit residents of
suburban communities. In fact, roughly $49.5 billion of the $65 billion in tax breaks were claimed by
residents of suburban communities, while the corresponding figure for city residents was one-third
as high, only $15.4 billion (Table B).a
TABLE A
 Distribution of Owner-Occupied Homes by Price
Metropolitan Areas Only, Inside and Outside Central Cities (CCs)
1990
Total Owner-Occupied Homes in Metro Areas: 44,045,859
Owner-Occupied Homes in CCs of Metro Areas: 14,588,932
Owner-Occupied Homes Outside CCs, Metro Areas: 29,456,927
House Price Central Cities Outside Central Cities
Ranges # in Range Percentage Cumulative # in Range Percentage Cumulative
<$20,000 591,186 4.1 4.1 465,891 1.6 1.6
$20,000-$29,999 823,806 5.6 9.7 651,505 2.2 3.8
$30,000-$39,999 1,270,521 8.7 18.4 1,153,439 3.9 7.7
$40,000-$49,999 1,490,195 10.2 28.6 1,706,889 5.8 13.5
$50,000-$59,999 1,463,435 10.0 38.7 2,082,127 7.1 20.6
$60,000-$69,999 1,448,369 9.9 48.6 2,450,430 8.3 28.9
$70,000-$79,999 1,204,672 8.3 56.8 2,443,166 8.3 37.2
$80,000-$89,999 921,292 6.3 63.2 2,097,099 7.1 44.3
$90,000-$99,999 740,000 5.1 68.2 1,857,961 6.3 50.6
$100,000-$124,999 1,073,677 7.4 75.6 3,109,044 10.6 61.2
$125,000-$149,999 784,544 5.4 81.0 2,581,582 8.8 69.9
$150,000-$174,999 604,012 4.1 85.1 2,079,698 7.1 77.0
$175,000-$199,999 460,717 3.2 88.3 1,550,566 5.3 82.3
$200,000-$249,999 588,717 4.0 92.3 1,894,954 6.4 88.7
$250,000-$299,999 383,578 2.6 94.9 1,167,916 4.0 92.7
$300,000-$399,999 362,124 2.5 97.4 1,099,998 3.7 96.4
$400,000-$499,999 154,511 1.1 98.5 456,855 1.6 97.9
$500,000+ 223,814 1.5 100.0 607,806 2.1 100.0
Source: U.S. Census: General Housing Characteristics (CH-1-1).Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development? Richard Voith
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TABLE B
Annual Value of Subsidy (Tax Breaks)
By Home Price and Location
Within Metro Areab
Home Price Outside




















aThese figures are based on 1990 data from the American
Housing Survey.  See my 1997 paper with Joseph Gyourko for
details.  According to the 1990 census, 40 percent of the metro-
politan population lived in the central city.  Note that only 24
percent of the value of deductibility accrued to residents of cen-
tral cities.
bThese figures overstate the total tax breaks because they are
based on a loan to value ratio of 80 percent, which exceeds the
market average.  The assumptions here are the same as those for
Table 2, page 8.
how parcels of land can be used.
There are a number of reasons com-
munities adopt zoning regulations.
But one reason they adopt large-lot
zoning is that residents of small,
low-priced housing may not gener-
ate enough property tax revenue to
cover the costs of providing the lo-
cal public services they use. Mini-
mum lot-size requirements can
make residence in the community
unaffordable for low-income house-
holds. In my 1998 paper, I show that
the special tax treatment of hous-
ing reinforces communities’ incen-
tives to adopt restrictions that effec-
tively limit access by low-income
households.12
The tax code provides incentives
for communities to adopt restrictive
zoning rules through its effect on
the relative cost of housing for high-
and low-income households. The
income tax code encourages high-
income households to choose large
lots while leaving low-income
households’ demand for large lots
unchanged. (Remember, low- and
moderate-income households’
housing costs are unaffected by tax
breaks because they generally find
it advantageous to take the stan-
dard deduction.) The tax code en-
courages a high-income community
to set high minimum-lot-size restric-
tions that do not affect the choices
of high-income people (because
their desired lots are at least as large
as the minimum, given their sub-
sidy) but effectively make the com-
munity unaffordable for low-in-
12See my August 1998 mimeo.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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come residents.  As the value of the tax deduc-
tion rises, the difference in the desired lot size
between high- and low-income households be-
comes larger, thus a rising subsidy effectively
lowers the cost to the community of imposing
this barrier to low-income households.13
On the flip side, if there are extra costs associ-
ated with having low-income households in the
community, more extensive sorting will nega-
tively affect the communities that have larger
concentrations of low-income residents effec-
tively excluded from other communities.14  The
increasing concentration of low-income residents
in these communities, which are usually older,
dense urban centers, forces these communities
to either raise taxes or reduce services.  These
adjustments make them less competitive with
suburban communities, so the additional zon-
ing restrictions induced by the tax code spur fur-
ther decentralization and lower density devel-
opment.  The very policies that encourage home
ownership also encourage geographic sorting
by income when there are restrictions such as
zoning.
HOW LARGE IS THE IMPACT
OF DEDUCTIBILITY?
Deductibility affects metropolitan-area land
use directly through its impact on how much
land households demand and where they choose
to live and indirectly through its impact on com-
munities’ choices regarding public amenities
and zoning. While it is extremely difficult to pre-
cisely determine the magnitude of either the di-
rect or indirect impact, it is possible to make some
estimates of the direct impact on residential den-
sity and, through simulation, to evaluate the
potential consequences of the indirect effects.
Deductibility and Residential Density.
Deductibility’s most direct effect is on individu-
als’ demand for residential land because deduct-
ibility reduces the after-tax cost of residential
land.   If we know how sensitive people’s land
consumption is to the cost of land and if we know
how much deductibility changes the after-tax
cost of land, we can estimate the direct effect of
deductibility on residential land use in a metro-
politan area. Using a large data set on house
sales in Montgomery County, a suburb of Phila-
delphia, Joseph Gyourko and I have estimated
that a 10 percent reduction in the after-tax cost
of land would yield a 10 percent increase in the
desired residential lot size.15
On average, the mortgage interest and prop-
erty tax deduction lowers the after-tax cost of
residential land and housing roughly 15 per-
cent.16  Given our estimate of the effect of price on
lot size, this implies that the mortgage interest
13In my 1998 mimeo, I show that increases in tax-
related housing subsidies for high-income households
can increase the likelihood of the adoption of restrictive
zoning rules even if low-income households do not im-
pose extra costs on high-income ones. Assuming the ob-
jective of the suburban community is to maximize the
value of its land, this occurs for two reasons.  First, as
subsidies increase, more low-value agricultural land is
converted to high-value residential land for each high-
income resident as his or her land consumption increases
with the subsidy. Second, constraining low-income resi-
dents in the city results in a much higher city-to-subur-
ban relative rent, so that more high-income people choose
suburban locations than would be the case without zon-
ing restrictions.
14See Janet Rothenberg Pack’s paper “Poverty and
Urban Public Expenditures,” for a discussion of the higher
cost of providing public services to low-income house-
holds.
15In the jargon of economists, this is a price elasticity
of -1.0. The econometric problem of estimating the rela-
tionship between quantity of residential land demanded
and the price of land is extremely complex because, in
general, we do not observe the price of land. Instead, we
observe the price of housing, which includes both the
land and the structure. As discussed in my 1998 mimeo
with Joseph Gyourko, it is possible to estimate this rela-
tionship if the appropriate kind of data, such as our
data on housing sales in Montgomery County, are avail-
able.Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development? Richard Voith
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deduction directly reduces residential density
15 percent. The estimated impact on residential
density must, however, be interpreted with cau-
tion for at least two reasons. First, while the hous-
ing subsidy makes the after-tax cost of housing
lower than the market price, the subsidy may be
partially capitalized, thus raising the market
price of houses. To the extent that increases in
market price offset the tax advantage, the in-
crease in land consumption will not be realized.
In fact, if supply does not adjust to changes in
demand at all, the housing subsidy will be offset
by increases in the market price. Second, the di-
rect effects on individual decisions do not cap-
ture the indirect effect of deductibility on com-
munities’ choices regarding zoning policies.
Deductibility and Residential Zoning.  Be-
cause deductibility lowers the costs, for high-
income families, of imposing zoning restrictions,
it has an impact on people’s choice of commu-
nity, residential sorting by income, and metro-
politan density. It is nearly impossible to directly
evaluate how large this impact is because it in-
volves fundamental shifts in the community’s
laws. If, for example, a change in the tax code
ultimately caused a community to adopt very
large minimum-lot-size zoning, the outcome in
terms of who lives in the community, the size of
residential lots, and the levels of public ameni-
ties might be dramatically different than if the
community did not choose large-lot zoning.
In my paper on the relationship between the
tax treatment of housing and zoning, I con-
ducted numerical simulations of a variety of
models to evaluate how larger tax breaks for
housing affect suburban communities’ choices
regarding zoning, and, in turn, how these
choices affect where high- and low-income
households choose to live, the size of residential
lots, and the relative amenities of city and sub-
urban communities.17 While these simulations
are only illustrative, they suggest that the indi-
rect effects of deductibility on community zon-
ing choices may have more important conse-
quences for metropolitan development than the
direct effects on individuals’ choices.
In most cases, these simulations suggest that
increases in housing subsidies for high-income
households increase the attractiveness of zon-
ing policies that limit access by low-income
households.18 In a typical simulation, if the sub-
sidy becomes large enough, it can cause sub-
urbs to adopt restrictive zoning (Figure 1). The
number of wealthy households residing in the
city slowly declines as the subsidy increases to
15 percent, then shifts dramatically downward
before it resumes its slow decline as the subsidy
increases further.19 The shift occurs because the
suburban community can increase the total value
of its land by shifting from no zoning to exclu-
sionary zoning.  Remember, Figure 1 illustrates
only the potential large effect; the actual magni-
tudes of impact depend on the type of model
used and should not be taken literally.
The simulation also provides interesting in-
formation about the changes in residential land
consumption by high-income households. Resi-
dential land consumption rises smoothly as sub-
sidies rise because the after-tax cost of land for
high-income households falls even though the
market price of land rises (Figure 2). When the
16See the paper by James Poterba for a discussion of
the tax-related subsidy to owner-occupied housing.
17These simulation models are fully described in my
1998 paper “Does the U.S. Tax Treatment of Housing
Create an Incentive for Exclusionary Zoning?”
18The subsidy is defined as the percentage reduction
in the after-tax cost of housing relative to the before-tax
flow of housing services.
19In this simulation, households are choosing their fa-
vored communities and lot size given the after-tax prices
of land, while communities are choosing whether to pur-
sue zoning policies that effectively exclude lower income
households (Figure 1).14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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FIGURE 1
Community Zoning Choice and
Number of High-Income People
In the City
FIGURE 2
Community Zoning Choice and
Suburban Land Consumption
By High-Income People
community shifts to a
zoning plan that ex-
cludes low-income house-
holds, however, land con-
sumption jumps to a
much higher level, then
resumes its smooth up-
ward path. The average
amount of land acquired
by each home owner in-
creases because the price
per acre of land falls
when the community
shifts from no zoning to
restrictive zoning. The
aggregate value of the
community’s land, how-
ever, increases because
more land is converted
from low-value agricul-
tural use to residential
use as more high-income
people move to the com-
munity and purchase
homes on larger lots.
Once again, the path of
housing consumption
shown in Figure 2 illus-
trates only the potential
effects of individual and
community responses to
housing subsidies.
The bottom line of the
simulation is that indi-
vidual responses to
changes in the tax treat-
ment of housing are un-
likely to capture the full
effect of such changes on
the pattern of metropoli-
tan development. If one
focuses only on indi-
vidual responses to hous-
ing subsidies, one might
conclude that they haveDoes the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the Pattern of Metropolitan Development? Richard Voith
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increased decentralization and concentrated
low-income households in central cities. But one
might also conclude that the subsidies have not
changed the pattern of metropolitan land use
that is characterized by higher income house-
holds predominantly choosing to live in low
density suburban communities. If one considers
the possible community responses as well, one
might reach a substantially different conclusion:
potentially, the tax treatment of housing can fun-
damentally change the pattern of metropolitan
development. When subsidies induce commu-
nities to institute restrictive zoning policies, such
as large minimum-lot sizes, such policies may
have a large impact on where high- and low-
income households choose to live, the size of
lots households buy, and the fundamental lev-
els of public services and amenities provided by
the community.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. tax treatment of housing affects
household choices regarding where to live and
how much land to consume. It also affects com-
munities’ incentives regarding their provision
of public amenities and their adoption of zon-
ing policies that exclude low-income house-
holds.  Deductibility tends to magnify the im-
pact of other economic forces that lead to decen-
tralization and geographic sorting by income.
Housing subsidies directly increase the amount
of land households wish to consume, and when
there is zoning, they increase the likelihood that
high- and low-income households will choose
separate communities. Indirectly, deductibility
lowers the cost of providing public amenities for
communities with primarily high-income house-
holds. More important, deductibility lowers the
cost of restrictive zoning and makes it more likely
that suburban communities will pursue such
policies.
Because deductibility affects not only indi-
viduals’ incentives but also communities’ incen-
tives, it is difficult to judge the size of the total
contribution of deductibility to decentralization
or geographic sorting by income. Estimates sug-
gest, however, that  for U.S. metropolitan areas,
the direct impact has lowered density about 15
percent. Housing tax policy may have had even
larger effects on the patterns of metropolitan de-
velopment and sorting through its effect on com-
munity zoning choices. Our simulation models
suggest that the impacts of housing tax policy
on zoning choices could alter the basic pattern
of development rather than just the degree of
decentralization. As many urban communities
struggle with high concentrations of poverty,
and as suburban communities confront chal-
lenges associated with rapid, decentralized de-
velopment, our analysis suggests that the mort-
gage and property tax deductions may make it
more difficult to cope with these challenges.
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